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COMMENTARY
MEDICINE AND LAW
Health Care Reform in Transition
Incremental Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
Elenora E. Connors, JD, MPH
ON JANUARY 20, 2010, SCOTT BROWN WON THEMassachusetts Senate seat held by EdwardKennedy for 46 years, ending the Democrats’filibuster-proof supermajority and stalling health
care reform. Lawmakers in both parties called for bipartisan
health insurance protections to supplant the more compre-
hensive packages, which currently include an individual pur-
chasemandate. Piecemeal reform could impose a tax onhigh-
cost plans, prohibit health status underwriting, require
continuation coverage for individuals younger than 25 years,
and fund state health insurance exchanges.1 Although incre-
mental reformwould provide some protection for vulnerable
individuals, it could have serious, unintended consequences.
Health Status Underwriting
Perhaps the most politically compelling incremental reform
would bar health status underwriting (ie, excluding or charg-
inghigher rates tounhealthy applicants).Nongroupand small-
group health plans almost uniformly deny coverage or charge
exorbitant premiums to those with preexisting conditions—
when the patient receives a diagnosis or treatment for a seri-
ous illness before plan enrollment. Therefore, a major access
problem in the private insurance market is that individuals
with health conditions are either excluded from purchasing
coverage or have premiums priced so high they cannot af-
ford it. In effect, individuals are denied coverage for exactly
what they need, which jeopardizes their health and the finan-
cial security of their family. Because of this dramatic exclu-
sionarypolicy, requiring insurers to cover individualswithpre-
existing conditions (in some cases only for those19 years)
has strong bipartisan support.1
State high-risk pools operate in 34 states, offering health
insurance to residents with preexisting medical conditions
who cannot purchase affordable coverage. However, they
comprise only 2% of the individual market and with pre-
miums averaging 125% to 200% of standard rates, cover-
age is unaffordable for many.2
Risk Pools and Rate Practices
In awell-functioningprivatemarket, health insurance spreads
the risk of individuals across a population to ensure that ev-
eryone can afford medical care when he or she needs it. In
effect, the healthy subsidize the sick as part of a social con-
tract, which recognizes that everyone may become ill one
day. In a good society, individuals should notwant for health
insurance because they are already sick or too poor to af-
ford coverage.
However, risk pools are functional only if they include
enough healthy individuals to keep overall health care
expenditures lower than premium costs so that high-cost
individuals will be covered. The larger the population in
the pool, the more predictable and stable premiums are
because the high cost of a few is spread out across many.
To ensure reasonably predictable and stable-expected
costs, insurers attempt to maintain risk pools of individu-
als with health similar to or better than that of the general
population.3
The extant individual health insurance market func-
tions badly and, as a result, the poor and sick are function-
ally excluded. Individuals with high expected claims are of-
ten excluded or charged exorbitant premiums because if a
risk pool has too many individuals in poor health, the av-
erage cost increases and those who are healthy are less likely
to join. Adverse selection—whereby those with higher-
than-average risk of needing health care are more likely to
seek insurance—results when multiple persons of poorer-
than-average health enroll in the pool.3 Countries with so-
cial insurance or single-payer systemswith a standard pack-
age of benefits donot encounter problemsof adverse selection
because everyone, regardless of health status, is covered.
However, in the United States, adverse selection increases
the average risk in the insurance pool, thus driving up pre-
miums.
Unintended Effects of Incremental Reform
Although providing greater access to health care is vitally
important, in practice requiring insurers to acceptmore high-
cost individuals without adding more healthy individuals
to the pool could result in adverse selection, increased costs,
and a potential financial death spiral.3 If insurers assign ev-
eryone the same rate (community rating), healthier indi-
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vidualswill encounter an increase in premiums andmay leave
the group. However, absent community rating, if insurers
adjust premiums based on the predicted costs of a group
(experience rating), individuals with poor health are priced
out of the market.
If there are no incentives ormandates for individuals who
are healthy to purchase insurance, risk pools will become
even more expensive, leading healthy individuals to leave
the market and resulting in even more adverse selection,
which forces insurers to continually raise premiums. This
cyclical effect is deemed the adverse selection death spi-
ral,3 leading to malfunctioning markets.
Spreading the Risk—The Return of the Mandate
Congress sought to broaden risk pools through a national
individual purchase mandate. A tax penalty would be lev-
ied on individuals who do not have qualifying insurance
with acceptable minimum coverage through government
(eg, Medicaid and Medicare), employers, the private sec-
tor, or new health insurance exchanges. Mandates, of
course, are ineffective and unfair without adequate subsi-
dies for poor individuals and families. Premium and cost-
sharing subsidies for low-income individuals and
expanded Medicaid eligibility would facilitate affordable
coverage and are critically important for expanding access
to medical care.
Amandate counteracts adverse selection by bringingmore
healthy individuals into the risk pool, thereby decreasing
premiums.Moreover, mandates decrease the number of un-
insured, thereby lessening cost-shifting due to uncompen-
sated care. Additional benefits include a decrease in “free
riders” or individuals who forgo private insurance believ-
ing theywill stay healthy or care will be available in an emer-
gency.4 Many cannot afford insurance, but others choose
not to purchase insurance because they are young andhealthy
(eg, 9.7million individuals earning$75 000 annually had
no coverage in 2008).5
Mandates, together with health status underwriting, pre-
vent insurers fromengaging in opportunisticmarketing prac-
tices, such as selectively seeking young, healthy individu-
als while discouraging the sick and the elderly. Insurers
perceive these practices as benign business decisions nec-
essary to overcome the “take up” problem of well-off indi-
viduals being unwilling to pay for risks that seem remote.4
However, these practices create enormous burdens for the
poor and the sick, and shift health care costs to the public
or charitable sectors.
Leading up to the Massachusetts election, conservatives
framed the mandate in terms of personal freedom, compul-
sory contracts, and transfer of money to a private party. Al-
though nothing prevents states from implementing insur-
ance purchasemandates (eg,Massachusetts), local lawmakers
threaten to challenge the federal government’s constitu-
tional powers to do so. Key Senate Republicans have spo-
ken out against the mandate, all but guaranteeing it stays
off the table for the agreed-upon incremental reforms.
The goals of health reform are to increase access to qual-
ity affordable care, while reining in costs. Incremental re-
forms cannot achieve these goals. Preexisting condition cov-
erage without a purchase mandate may benefit the sick, but
ultimately may make insurance even less affordable for ev-
eryone and particularly the least well-off. Funding for state
exchanges could increase access if states could keep costs
downwhile offering guaranteed benefits packages and sub-
sidies. However, without insurer standards and a larger par-
ticipating population, exchanges have often proven inef-
fective and expensive.6 AlthoughPresidentObama’s proposed
discretionary spending onpublic programs, information tech-
nology, and health promotion is critical, it is not sufficient
to increase access and equity; and it will only marginally re-
duce costs.
Certainly, incremental reform has expanded public pro-
grams (eg, the Children’s Health Insurance Plan) and cov-
erage continuation (Heath Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act). However, piecemeal changes have done
little to improve the small-group and individual market.7
Almost everyone agrees that the extant private market can-
not ensure health care for all at an affordable cost. Com-
prehensive reform can bring improved health and security
to the population. If this goal must be accomplished the
“Americanway” through the private system, the simple logic
of insurance has to prevail, which is to spread the risk among
everyone—rich and poor, healthy and sick, young and old
alike.
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